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JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
EDITED BY C. W. IQOKE 
ProJwror o/ Low, G r o r p d m  Univerdy 
The City’s Liability on Street Improvement 
Bonds in I m . - A  recent decision of the Supreme 
Court of Iowa, holding a city liable for the h- 
ance of street improvement bonds. will no doubt 
act as a warning to municipalities in this state in 
the issuing of such b o n b  in the future.’ The 
Iowa law authorized cities and t o m  to aasesa the 
mt of street improvements against property 
subject to Pssessment therefor. and the council 
is empowered to im h o n d s  for the amount of 
the aaeaaed cost or any part thereof in anticipa- 
tion of the deferred payment of the awssrnents. 
The statute prescribes the form in which such 
street improvement bonds shall be issued. which 
among other things must contain the statement: 
I t  is hereby certi6ed and mi t ed  that all tbe 
acts. conditions. and things required to be done, 
d e n t  to and in issuing this series of bonds. 
Rave been done. happened, and performed, in 
regular and due form. as required by Law and 
anid resolution. and for the assessment. collection 
and payment haeon of said special tax, the full 
faith and diligence of said city (or town) of - 
are hereby irrevocably pledged.’ 
It is also provided that 
Such certi6catts, bonds. and coupons shall not 
make the city liable in any way, except for the 
proper application of said special taxes.’ 
Many cities have found, for one ceaSOn or 
another. that there wm no money in the spccial 
fund to pay the principal and interest on the last 
bonds in the series. Cities have usually con- 
tended that they were not liable under the statute 
for indebtedness incurred in this manncr. 
On Decomber 13, 1QU. the Supreme Court of 
Ionx passed upon this question in a test cwe 
which involved four diflerent street improve 
ments’ b n d s  of the city of Dw Moines. The 
court reaffirmed a previous decision that a “city 
can render i k l f  liable if in breach of the terms 
of the bond it wrongfully fails to perform i ts  duty 
and its pledge pertaining to the assessment and 
collection of the special t ax  by which the special 
1 Howr v. Cily of Du Mmnw. 216 N. Y. 689. 
*Code of Iolm.  IW?. &f. 6114. 
= mi.. see. 8123. 
fund is to he aw~t..ui.”~and the court further held 
that while .these street improvement bonb did 
not of themoelves create an indebtedness of the 
city, they did, however, crate an obligation of 
the city to perform certain statutory dutiea in 
the levy and collection of pecial tues for tbc 
payment of the bonds. “The liability of the 
city.” Mid the court, “an8a out of the breach 
of the obligations of the bond. The caw of 
action of the bondhokier in in the nature of 
damages for such breach. The measure of hi 
damages is nerrsssrily the unpaid amount of the 
bond which has been rendered uncollectsbk by 
the wrongful breach. In view of the fact that 
the maiaure of damage is specific and ir identical 
with the amount of the bond. the distinction 
hetween an action on the bond, and an action for 
the breach of it, becomes a mere matter of 
WOnia.” 
Pour different bonds were involved in thii 
1. Payment on the tint bond had been 
refused by the city treasurer on the p u n d  tlut 
there WM no fund out of which i t  could be paid. 
Tbe court held that it WIU the duty of the city to 
provide by special aasessment a fund ndEcient 
to pay the bonds and the intereat on them. 
0. In the second bond it appeared that provi- 
sion had originally been made for special 
ments sufficient to pay off all the bonds in the 
series, but that certain property ownem maeaaed 
successfully prusecuted appeals in the dirtr id 
court. which materially reduced the anticipated 
collections for the special auarsment fund and 
thus made the plaintiffs bond uncollectable. 
The court held the city at fault for not making 
up the deficiency by rcaaawsing the amount of 
auch depletion against the abutting property. 
“Its duty a t  this point,” mid the court, “wan no 
less than its origid duty to make an assessment 
adequate to the peyment of the bonds.” 
3. In the third caae a bond for )coo wad mu- 
d e n 4  uncollectnble because certain property 
owners bad failed and refused to pay their 
Iowa 588. 
oase: 
‘Fort Dodoc Bircbis Co. v. Cifu of Fort D&. 116 
JUDICIAL DECISIONS 1237 
assessments and the county treasurer had failed 
to oollact the cmme by tax d e  for want of a bid- 
der. Here the court held that the city had 
wholly failed to exercise ita statutory power in 
the making of such ~ l l e c t i ~ ~  and had breached 
its pledge of good faith and diligence to that end. 
The city could have bid in the property and 
thus enforced itn lien. 
4. The fourth bond wan the lost in its eeriea, 
which could not be paid for la.& of funds, because 
the aaaentments on certain properties were in 
ex- of 45 per cent of their value. Some of the 
ownem refwed to pay the tax, and the county 
treasurer found no bidden at tax d e ,  but at M 
adjourned tax d e  the properties were sold for 
lees than the amount of the tax, thus making the 
deficiency in the fund. The court made quick 
work of this w e ,  declaring that if the 8sclesament 
had been confined to 96 per cent of the value of 
the property, as provided by law, the full amount 
of the tax  could have been collected by tax sale. 
In the light of this deckion there seems to be 
nothing for the citiee which have defaulted on 
public improvement bonC to do but to accept 
their liability. The American Munin’paldk 
for January, in commenting upon this decision, 
seemn to imply that cities would be better off if 
they issued “certificates” instead of bonds. In 
view of another recent decision of the Supreme 
Court of Iowa in the caae of Wutnn Aaplualt 
Paving Company v. Citg of Marahalltown,‘ i t  
would Beem that there is little opportunity for a 
city in this state to escape its liability for either. 
bonds or certificates issued in payment of public 
improvements. This is, no doubt, as it should 
be, and these decisions should serve aa a warning 
to city councils and the taxpayers alike that 
when public improvements are undertaken 
which are payable by special assessments upon 
the benefited property, the greatest care must be 
exercised to make sure that the property assessed 
will be able to pay out. When the city asks the 
contractor or the public to take these street 
improvement bonds and certificates. the good 
name and credit of the city demands that the 
city make p d  any deficiencies arising from 
errors of judgment or negligence on the part of the 
city authorities. U this were not so, cities might 
6nd it difficult to finance such improvements 
because of’lack of confidence on the part of 
contractors and investors in special assessment 
d t i e s .  
The decision will no doubt work a hardship 
. a  214 N. W. 687 (Iowa. lQ27). 
upon those cities whose over-optimistic councils 
have forced street improvements upon their 
communities in advance of their needs and be- 
yond the ability of the property assessed to meet 
the payments. But when city councils realize 
that street improvement bonds will become 
general obligations of the city, unless properly 
and legally assessed. they will weigh more 
carefully the objections of property owners 
before disregarding them. 
FRANK E. HOEACK. 
The State University of Iowa. * 
Special Assessments-Direct Liability of City 
on Bonds Issued.-The interesting note by 
Mensor  Horack on the case of Eallgc v. Dw 
Muinea suggests a comparison with another 
recent case involving the m e  point. In Moore 
v. Cdg of Nampa, 18 Fed. (ad) 880, decided by 
the Circuit Court of Appeals, ninth circuit, in 
April. 1937, the bonds in question contained 
recitals similar to those in the Hauge case, and 
the liability of the city was likewise predicated 
upon the negligence of the city in failing to per- 
form its statutory duties to make a valid levy 
and collect the funds to pay the bonds. The 
Idaho statute provided that the holder of such 
bonds “shall have no remedy therefor against the 
municipal corporation by which the same is 
issued in any event, except for the collection 
of the special assessment made . . ., but his 
remedy in case of nonpayment shall be confined 
to the enforcement of such assessment.” The 
court affirmed a judgment of the district court 
sustaining a demurrer to the complaint. 
These two cases illustrate the conflict of 
decisions that prevails in this class of cases 
based upon like facts, but the great weight of 
authority is in support of the view of the Circuit 
Court of Appeals. If the city is relieved of 
direct liability, the bondholder has a remedy by 
mandamus to compel the proper ofIicers to make 
a new or supplementary assessment and collect 
the necessary funds to liquidate the bonds. The 
earlier cases bearing upon the general question 
of the direct liability of the special assessment 
district are reviewed in an extensive note to 
Capitd Heighta v. Steiner. 311 Ala. 640, 101 
So. 451, published in 38 A. L. R. le71 (1955). 
The Hauge case is supported by a long line of 
decisions in Iowa (note, 18 Iowa Law Review 81). 
and evidently the only method left open to avoid 
the direct liability of municipal corporations on 
that state is by an amendment to the enabling 
asa NATIONAL MUNICIPAL REVIEW [April 
act further expressly restricting the right of the 
bondholder against the city to a remedy by 
mandamus and requiring a recital in the bond 
itself of such a limitation and that it is payable 
only out of proceeds of the funds raised by the 
special assessment. 
tations upon municipal indebtedness are uni- 
formly held not to apply to judgments in tort, 
the evil of excessive direct obligations upon the 
city, resulting from failure to perform statutory 
duties of this nature, should be kept within 
reasonable bounds wherever, as here, it can be 
done without injustice to anyone. * 
As the constitutional limi-- 
Municipallb&ms-m.-The Supreme 
decided January 7 of this year, holds that a city 
of the first class under ita power to acquire lands 
within five miles of its limits for park purposea 
may take land for a park, 70 per cent of which is 
to be used for an aviation field. The court in 
its opinion reviews the progress of aviation and 
cites the statutes of various states expressly 
conferring the power in question. It also re- 
views the decision# which show the extension of 
park functions to include tourist camps and other 
new social activities. This progressive view of 
the extension of the implied power of munici- 
palities by the change in social conditions ia not 
followed by some states (Kennedy v. Neuada, 
581 S. W. 56, Mo. 1926). and therefore the express 
delegation of the power to establish airports is 
advisable. (See Act No. 328, Pa. Laws of 
1925, Ch. 534. Sec. 57, Mass. Laws 1959, Sec. 
3667, par. 16, General Code of Ohio.) Upon the 
general subject of the extension of municipal 
functions, the reader may be referred to a note 
published in the August, 1996, number of this 
REVIEW. * 
-tml over Building on Mnnufactur- 
ing Property Included in Residence District.- 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in In  re 
Gilfillun’s Permit, 140 Atl. 136, has refused to 
follow the extremely broad application of the 
police power which waa s h e d  by the District 
Federal Court of Minnesota in American Woodc 
Produd Co. v. Minneupolw, 91 Fed. (a) 441, 
which was reported in the December, 1947, issue 
of the REVIEW. In the instant case the peti- 
tioner, who operated a lumber yard in a section 
that was mned as a residence district, was refused 
a permit to erect on his yard a building of con- 
crete blocks to house his lumber and other 
court of I(anrras in Wichita v. Chpp, a6s Pac. 19. 
supplies. I n  sustaining the court of common 
pleas, which directed an issuance of the permit, 
the supreme court points out that the erection 
of the building in question would lessen the 6re 
haurrd, eliminate the tendency of, undesirable 
persons to gather in the vicinity, conduce to the 
health of the community and enhance the 
attractiveness and value of the surrounding 
property. As the petitioner’s business had been 
long established before the zoning restriction 
wapl enacted, the lands were charged with a lawful 
use which the city waa without power to deatroy. 
This is an illustration of the class of caaea in 
which the zoning board of appeals should allow 
an exception to be made to the strict ProVisiOM 
of the ordinance; otherwise there seems to be no 
sound reaeon for its existence. (Dobbinr v. 
h Ang&. 195 U. S. aaS; Wss&m Thwlogkul 
Seminay v. Emamton. 156 N. E. 778.) * 
Police Power--public Taxicab Stand on 
Railroad Pmpetty.-The Supreme Court of the 
United States, in a decision handed down 
February 21. unanimously reversed the decision 
of the Circuit Court of Appeals, t h i i  circuit. 
inD.L.&WW.R.RCo.v.dforristaon.14Fed. 
(ed) 2-57, which was commented upon in the 
April, 1997, issue of this REVIEW. The court 
hqlds that the town does not have any right to 
establish a public hackstand on the driveway 
upon the plaintiffs premises without just 
compensation and that the company may grant 
an exclusive privilege therefor to one operator. 
Mr. Justice Butler in his opinion says: “The 
police power may be and frequently it is exerted 
to effect a purpose or consummate an enterprise 
in the public interest that requires the taking of 
private property; but, whatever the purpose or 
the means employed to accomplish it, the owner 
is entitled to compensation for what is taken from 
him. The railroad grounds, station. platforms, 
driveways, etc.. are used by the petitioner for the 
purposes of its business as a common carrier and, 
while the businem is subject to regulation in the 
public interest, the property used belongs to 
petitioner. The state may not require it to be 
used in that business, or take it  for another 
public use, without just cornpennation, for that 
would contravene the due pnwxss clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. (Coeee cited.) 
“As against thw not using it for the purpose 
of transportation, petitioner’s railroad is private 
property in every legal sense. The driveway in 
question is owned and held by petitioner in the 
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same right and stands on the same footing as its 
o k f r c i l i t i a .  Itaprimary purpose into provide 
mesnr of ingress and egress for patrow and others 
having burinejs with the petitioner. But, if any 
part of the land in the driveway is capable of 
other use that does not interfere with the dis- 
charge of its obligations as a carrier, petitioner. 
an an incident of its ownenhip and in order to 
make profit for itself. har a right to IUC or permit 
others to IMC such land for any lawful purpose." * 
Fdke Powem-Reasonabb Regulation of 
Bwiuea Q of Socirl Actioitles.-Under a gen- 
eral delegation of the locol police power a city 
may enact regulations which will be in dect 
l d  laws, provided they pnreribe g e d  n k  
of conduct fairly definite and are m m b k  
rdrptsd to protect or insure the safety, hahlth. 
m o d  or wrd weusre of the community. 
"hat a city may enact a valid ordinance denouno 
ing (u a dimorderly person anyone who appears or 
trsveb upon the stnets masked or disguised M) 
M to conad  his identity wan atlirmal by the 
Court of Appeals of Kentucky in P i d  v. 
Marahall, lt89 S. W. 1072. That an ordinana 
requiring barber shops to close at  7 P. Y. week 
dayr except Saturdays at  9 P. M. and prohibiting 
a l o d  barben serving white children is un- 
reanonable and void waa held by the Supreme 
Court of Georgia in Chairsr v. ALhnla, 139 
S. E. 669. 
In Nna Cortb v. Withera, 159 Atl. 880, the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the 
city by bill in equity could compel the removal of 
plumbing instalkd in the h o w  of the defendant 
by her husband, a licensed plumber, which WM 
found not to comply with the nquiranentr of the 
atate plumbing code. The judiad control of 
the c o d  to set a ide  such a statute, M die- 
tinguished from an ordinance, is limited to those 
caaea where there is a palpable invasion of the 
fundamental law or where there appears upon 
ita face that it has no real or substantial relation 
to the public health, safety or morals; in all other 
caaea the legislative determination is held to be 
conclusive. 
Where the ordinance relates directly to the 
public health, the means adopted to secure its 
enforcement is most liberally co~trued. h 
8atC v. S p i l h ,  262 Pac. 128, an ordinana of 
the city of Auburn required each home holder to 
keep a garbage can and deposit all garbage 
therein and imposed a penalty for noncompli- 
ance. It wan further provided that the failure 
to possess ouch a can and the w of the city 
water by the home holder should constitute 
prima facie proof of the violation of the ordi- 
MU*. The Supreme Court of Washington 
upheld the ordinance on the authority of 
Mob&. dc. R. R. v. Tumipecd, P1D U. S. 95. 
The extent to which reasonable control over the 
dispwal of garbage by private individupls er- 
tendr is set forth in Cdifmnia Rtdudk Co. v. 
Sanitary Radudiun Co., 100 U. S. SOB. 
The extent to which discrimination may be 
held to be nssonable is illustrated by the decision 
of the supreme court of Washington in ~cottlc v. 
Qnwri. a68 Pac. Se8. in which an ordinance 
excepting from a Sunday closing law the d e  of 
meals served on the premisea. prepared tobacco. 
milk. fruit, confectionery, newspapera, maga- 
zines and medical and surgical appliance was 
sustained. Classification b e d  upon the nature 
of the business in upheld on the ground that the 
law operates equally upon all persons similarly 
rituated. A conviction of the defendant, a 
grocer, for a violation of the ordinance WPI 
unanimously 8517x14. 
